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### 1NC

T: USFG

#### Affs should defend hypothetical implementation of antitrust law in alignment with the rez.

#### “Resolved” requires law

WP 64, (Words and Phrases, 1964, Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “USFG” means any of the three branches

US Code 88, 42 U.S. Code § 4914, “Development of low-noise-emission products,” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/4914>)

(2) The term “Federal Government” includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government of the United States, and the government of the District of Columbia.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayon, and FTC Acts

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Vote neg:

#### clash ⁠— open subjects cause monopolization of the moral high ground, which denies a role for the neg and prevents second level understanding and turns case

Grossberg 15, Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence Grossberg, 2015, “We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC,” <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9

[footnote 9 beings]

For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc.

[footnote 9 ends]

And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to produc[e]ing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

### 1NC---K

**The World Computer is the system of computational racial capitalism that presents the world as we know it through the process of *real abstraction*, where information and meaning is quantified from social qualifiers in order to extract value in the form of capital risk.**

**Beller 21** (Jonathan Beller = Professor of Humanities and Media Studies and Critical and Visual Studies at Pratt Institute, “*The World Computer: Derivative Conditions of Racial Capitalism”*, Duke University Press, BEH)

Information as Real Abstraction Taking the **notion that Capital was always a computer as a starting point** (Dyer-Witheford, 2013), The World Computer understands the **history of the commodification** of life as a process of encrypting the world’s myriad qualities as quantities. Formal and informal techniques, from double-entry bookkeeping and racialization, **to the rise of information and discrete state machines**, imposed **and extended the tyranny of racial capital’s relentless calculus of profit.** By means of the **coercive colonization of almost all social spaces, categories, and representations**—where **today language, image, music, and communication all depend upon a computational substrate** that is an outgrowth of fixed capital—all, or nearly all, expressivity has been captured in the dialectic of massive capital accumulation on the one side and radical dispossession on the other. **Currently the money-likeness of expression**—**visible as “likes”** and in other attention metrics that treat attention and affect as currency—is symptomatic of the financialization of daily life (Martin, 2015a). **All expression,** no matter what its valence, **is conscripted by algorithms of profit** that intensify **inequality by being put in the service of racial capitalism**; consequently, we are experiencing a near- apocalyptic, world-scale failure to be able to address global crises including migration for reparations, carceral systems, genocide, militarism, climate racism, racism, pandemic, anti-Blackness, extinction, and other geopolitical ills. The colonization of semiotics by racial capital has rendered **all “democratic” modes of governance outmoded** save those designed for the violent purpose of extracting profits for the enfranchised. Culturally these modes of extraction take the form of fractal fascism. An **understanding that informationalized semiotic practices** function as financial derivatives may **allow for a reimagining of the relationship between** language, visuality, and that other economic medium, namely **money, in an attempt to reprogram economy** and therefore the creation and distribution of value**—and thus also the politics and potentials of representation.** In what would amount to an end to postmodernism understood as the cultural logic of late capitalism, our revolutionary politics require, as did the communisms of the early twentieth century, a new type of economic program. In the age of computation, putting political economy back on the table implies a reprogramming of our cultural logics as economic media for the radical redress of the ills of exploitation and the democratization of the distribution of the world social product. **Sustainable communism requires the decolonizaton of abstraction** and the remaking of the protocols of social practice that give rise to real abstraction. **Though in this section we will more narrowly address the issues of money, race, and information as “real abstraction,” and their role in computational racial capitalism**, we note the overarching argument for the larger study: **1 Commodification inaugurates the global transformation** of qualities into quantities and gives rise to the world computer. **2 “Information” is not a naturally occurring** reality but emerges in the footprint of price and is always a means to posit the price of a possible or actual product. 3 **The general formula for capita**l, M-C-Mʹ, where M is money, C is commodity, and Mʹ is more money) can be **rewritten M-I-Mʹ,** where I is information. 4 “Labor,” Attention, Cognition, Metabolism, **Life converge as “Informatic Labor” whose purpose,** with respect to Capital, **is to create state changes in the Universal Turing Machine** that is the World Computer— racial capital’s relentless, granular, and planetary computation of its accounts**. 5 Semiotics, representation, and categories of social difference** function as financial derivatives—as wagers on the economic value of their underliers and as means of structuring risk for capital. 6 **Only a direct engagement with the computational colonization** of the life-world through a reprogramming (remaking) of the material processes of abstraction that constitute real abstraction can secure victory—in the form of a definitive step out of and away from racial capitalism—for the progressive movements of our times. Such a definitive movement requires an occupation and decolonization of information, and therefore of computation, and therefore of money. Only through a remaking of social relations at the molecular level of their calculus, informed by struggle against oppression, can the beauty of living and the fugitive legacies of creativity, community, and care prevail. The mode of comprehension, analysis, and transformation proposed here will require an expanded notion of racial capitalism. It interrogates the existence of deep continuities and long-term emergences—what one could correctly call algorithms of extractive violence—in the history of capitalism. These algorithms of violence include the reading and writing of code(s) on bodies, their surveillance and overcoding by informatic abstraction. Such algorithms of epidermalization or “the imposition of race on the body” (Browne: 113) are inscribed and executed on the flesh (Spillers 1987); and they are executed by means of codification processes that violently impose both a metaphysical and physical reformatting of bodies. As Simone Browne shows, epidermalization is given “its alphanumeric form” (99) through a vast array tools of marking, scarification, discipline, and surveillance that include branding irons, implements of torture, auction blocks, ship design, insurance policies, newspaper ads for runaway “property,” photographs in postcard form and a panoply of other media of dehumanization. Executable code is imposed as social categories of race, gender, religion and property, as ideologies, psychologies, contracts, brands, communication theories, game theories, and quantities of money—these abstractions work their ways into and are indeed imposed by the machines of calculation—and their avatars. We confront a continuous process of unmaking and remaking using all means available; it is violently inscribed on bodies. Sylvia Wynter, in her post– Rodney King piece “No Humans Involved: An Open Letter to My Colleagues” writes, “Both W. E. B. Du Bois and Elsa Goveia have emphasized the way in which the code of ‘Race’ or the Color Line, functions to systemically predetermine the sharply unequal re-distribution of the collectively produced global resources; and therefore, the correlation of the racial ranking rule with the Rich/Poor rule. Goveia pointed out **that all American societies are integrated on the basis of a central cultural belief** in which all share. This belief, that of **the genetic-racial inferiority** of Black people to all others, functions to enable our social hierarchies, including those of rich and poor determined directly by the economic system, to be perceived as having been as pre-determined by ‘that great crap game called life,’ as have also ostensibly been the invariant hierarchy between White and Black. Consequently in the Caribbean and Latin America, within the terms of this sociosymbolic calculus, to be ‘rich’ was also to be ‘White,’ to be poor was also to be ‘Black’ ” (Wynter: 52). “To be ‘rich’ was also to be ‘White,’ to be poor was also to be ‘Black.’ ” The real abstraction imposed by executable code—the “**code of ‘Race’ ” that “functions to systematically predetermine** the structurally **unequal redistribution of global resources**” is beholden to mediating capitalist exchange while embarking on a radical reformatting of ontology. This reformatting, the supposed result of “that great crap game called life,” brutally correlates race and value, but not entirely by chance, while racial capitalism embarks on imposing this calculus globally. Racial abstraction is endemic to what we will further explore as “real abstraction”; the evacuation of quality by abstract categories and quantities is, as we shall see in more detail, a “necessary” correlate to a world overrun by the calculus of money. Such algorithms of violence encode social difference, and although they may begin as heuristics (“rules of thumb”), they are none the less crucial to the **calculated and calculating expansion of racial capital**. Its processes and processing structures the meanings that can be ascribed to— and, as importantly, what can be done to—those of us whose data profiles constitute us as “illegal,” “Mexican,” “Black,” “[Roma] Gypsy,” “Jew,” and a lexicon of thousands of other actionable signs. This codification process draws from the histories of slavery, of colonialism, of state formation, of genocide, of gender oppression, of religious pogroms, of normativity, and again from the militarization and policing and the apparatuses of calculation that have developed within states and parastates in their own biometric pursuit of capital—power. Their violent destruction and remaking of the world. The **internalization of these codes**, including the struggles with them and the ways in which they license and/or foreclose various actions, exists in a recursive relationship to their perilous refinement. **Their analysis, a code-breaking of sorts,** will therefore demand some drastic modifications in many of the various anticapitalist, antistate warrior-stances practiced to date, particularly in a large number of their European and U.S. incarnations that until very recently remained blind to their own imperial violence and are too often complicit with hegemonic codes of masculine, unraced agency, imperialist nationalism, and default liberal assumptions in relation to questions of race, gender, sexuality, coloniality, and other forms of historically institutionalized oppression.3 The analytic, **computational racial capital, would identify the field of operations** that emerges around the embryonic form of the commodity and coarticulates with racial abstraction to formalize its code, code **that serves as operating system for the virtual machine here hypostasized as “the world computer”** and by inscribing itself on bodies and everything else. The commodity, the analysis of which famously begins volume 1 of Marx’s Capital, expressed the dual being and indeed dual registration of the humanly informed object as both quality of matter and quantity of exchange-value, along with the global generalization of this form. “The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an immense collection of commodities” (125). Commodities were (and with some modifications to be discussed further on, still are) humanly informed materials with a **use-value and an exchange-value— humanly informed qualities indexed by quantities**. “Computational racial capital,” as a heuristic device, stages an analysis of the convergence of what on the one side often appeared as universal: **the economic, abstract, and machinic operating systems of global production** and reproduction endemic to the commodity form and its calculus, with what on another side, sometimes appeared as particular or even incidental: racism, colonialism, slavery, imperialism, and racialization. The concept organizes this dramaturgy of analytically reunifying elements that were never materially separate in light of the study that the late Cedric Robinson conducted and recorded as Black Marxism. Robinson writes, “The development, organization and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions, so too did social ideology. As a material force, then, it could be expected that racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures emergent from capitalism. I have used the term ‘racial capitalism’ to refer to the development and to the subsequent structure as an historical agency” (1983: 2–3). The World Computer takes what Robinson saw as “civilizational racism,” and its central role in the development of capital as axiomatic,—and sees that this role extends to and deeply into capitalist calculation and machinery during the entire period in which the world economic system seems to have moved form the paradigm of the commodity to a paradigm of information. “**Computational racial capitalism” would** **thus understand the generalization of computation** as an extension of capital logics and practices that include and indeed require the economic calculus of the dialectics of social difference. These differences, both economic and semiotic, would include those plied by slavery, anti- Blackness and other forms of racism during the past centuries. Computation must **therefore be recognized** as not a mere technical emergence but the **practical result of an ongoing and bloody struggle** between the would-have- it-alls and the to-be-dispossessed. Developed both consciously and unconsciously, computational racial capitalism is, when seen in the light of ongoing racialization and value extraction, “the subsequent structure as an historical agency.” The racial logic of computation must be pursued when considering finance, surveillance, population management, policing, social systems, social media, or any of the vast suite of protocols plying difference for capital. The local instance of computation, a specific 1 or 0, may seem value neutral, a matter as indifferent as lead for a bullet or uranium for a bomb. But we are looking at computation as the modality of a world- system. Computation emerges as **the result of struggles that informed “class struggle**” in all its forms, recognized or not by the often spotty tradition(s) of Marxism, including those struggles specific to the antagonisms of colonialism, slavery, imperialism, and white supremacist heteropatriarchal capitalism more generally. It is the result of struggles indexed by race, gender, sexuality, nationality, and ethnicity, along with additional terms indexing social differentiation too numerous to incant here but that together form a lexicon and a grammar of extractive oppression—and as we have said and as must always be remembered, also of struggle. The lexicon includes compressions that result in many of history’s abstractions including a perhaps singularly pointed abstraction: “a history whose shorthand is race” (Spillers 1997: 142). The grammar for that lexicon depends upon the deployment and execution of forms of differentiating abstraction that are lived—lived processes of abstraction and lived abstraction organized by the increasingly complex and variegated calculus of profit and thus of domination. “**Real abstraction,”** then**, emerges** not just as money in Sohn-Rethel’s sense, but **as the codification of race, gender, sexuality, geography, credit and time**—and gives rise to a “grammar,” in Hortense Spillers’s (1987) use of the term, that not only structures meaning and redounds to the deepest crevices of being smelted by social practices, but also, and not incidentally, prices differentials indexed to social difference.4 “Real abstraction,” as Sohn-Rethel spent his life deciphering, takes place “behind [our] backs” as the practical and historical working out of the exchange of equivalents within the process of the exchange of goods (33). For him, the development of the money-form, of the real abstraction that is money, is Exhibit A of the abstraction process mediating object exchange. This capacity for abstraction, realized first in “the money commodity” and then as money provided the template for further abstraction, not least in the conceptual formations of Western philosophy itself (1978). Sohn-Rethel develops this argument that practices of exchange precede the abstraction of value in Intellectual and Manual Labour, providing the full quotation from Marx: “Men do not therefore bring the product of their labour into relation with each other as value because they see these objects merely as the material integuments of homogeneous human labour. The reverse is true: by equating their different products to each other in exchange as values, they equate their different kinds of labour as human labour. They do this without being aware of it. (Marx 1990: 166 in Sohn-Rethel 1978: 32). Here is Sohn- Rethel’s commentary: People become aware of the exchange abstraction only when they come face to face with the result which their own actions have engendered “behind their backs” as Marx says. In **money the exchange abstraction achieves concentrated representation**, but a mere functional one— embodied in a coin. It is not recognizable in its true identity as abstract form, but disguised as a thing one carries about in one’s pocket, hands out to others, or receives from them. Marx says explicitly that the value abstraction never assumes a representation as such, since the only expression it ever finds is the equation of one commodity with the use- value of another. The gold or silver or other matter which lends to money its palpable and visible body is merely a metaphor of the value abstraction it embodies, not this abstraction itself. (33–34) Exchange-value is “in our heads” but is not the creation of any individual. Alongside use-value it is the other, abstract component of the “double being” of the commodity-form. Like Norbert Wiener’s (1961: 132) definition of information but, strictly speaking, emerging long before the idea of information proper, real abstraction is “not matter or energy.” There is not an atom of matter in exchange-value, or, as Marx puts it, “Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values; in this it is the direct opposite of the coarsely sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical objects” (1990: 138). And a bit on, “So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange-value in a pearl or diamond” (177). But unlike in Wiener’s naturalist definition of information, exchange-value is an index of a social relation, an historical outcome. It indexes “abstract universal labor time,” a third term that forms the basis of comparison between two ostensibly incomparable and therefore incommensurable commodities, and, because common to both, creates the ratio of value that renders them quantitatively commensurable. **This distinction between the social basis of exchange-value and the universal character** of information should give us pause. As we shall have occasion to observe, information, as it is today (mis)understood, is thought to be a naturally occurring additional property of things—neither matter nor energy—rather than a domain of expression constituted by means of a technological and economic repression of its social dimension. Notably, Sohn-Rethel “set[s] out to argue that the **abstractness operating in exchange and reflected in value does nevertheless find an identical expression**, namely the abstract intellect, or the so-called pure understanding—the cognitive source of scientific knowledge” (34). For him, it gives rise to the abstract capacities of the subject of philosophy as well as the quantitative capacities of the subject of science and mathematics that in the twentieth century move toward a paradigm of information. Echoing Sohn-Rethel, we could say then that information is in our machines but not the creation of any individual machine. Not an atom of matter enters into information, though, like value, it is platformed on matter and requires energy for creation. This thesis will take on particular importance as we consider social differences whose descriptors, it turns out, are executable in a computational sense, at least from the point of view of financial calculus, but platformed on matter, and indeed, on living matter, on life. Beyond the intention of any individual, abstraction as “exchange-value” in “money” occurs in and as the process and processing of exchange in accord with an emerging standard. This standard, which economists call “exchange-value,” and which, in Marx is based on abstract universal labor time (the historically variable, socially necessary average time required to produce a commodity), persists alongside and within the specific qualities of the commodity (its use-value) and creates the commodity’s dual being. Though without chemical or material basis, **this standard, exchange-value, is a social relation**—a social relation as an abstraction—that inheres in the commodity-form itself and is formalized with the rise of the money commodity. The money commodity, in becoming a general equivalent, standardizes and thus renders fully quantifiable the exchange-value of commodities—exchange-values denominated in quantities of money. The quantification of value in a measure of money is an abstraction enabled by money itself which, as we have seen, is a real abstraction. It is a calculation that has occurred behind our backs, and indeed produces what Hayek (1945) identifies as the price system. When we recognize the differences in wages among people who are raced, gendered, nationed, and classed by various matrices of valuation, we also recognize that the calculus performed by and as real abstraction includes racial abstraction and gender abstraction. It is part of the calculus of **capital that provides it with an account of and discounts on the rate of exchange** with the labor power of marked people(s) —by discounting people(s) (Beller 2017b; see also Bhandar and Toscano 2015: 8–17). Racial abstraction provides capital with an index that measures a deviation from the average value of human life (itself historically driven down by the falling rate of profit). In this, computational racial capitalism is not merely a heuristic or a metaphor for the processes of a virtual machine; it is a historical-material condition. As we shall see, and as is obvious at least in the general case to anyone who has thought seriously about it, whiteness (and the fascist masculinity endemic to it) is not only operating where one finds “race”: it is operating everywhere in the imperium that it can be imagined (by some) that race is not a factor—**in medicine, in science, in statistics, in computation, in information**. As I wrote—resituating Bateson’s (1972) definition of information—in The Message Is Murder, **information is not merely “a difference that makes a difference”; it is a difference that makes a social difference**. **This slight difference in expression situates information historically.** While in keeping with Bateson’s far reaching ideas regarding an ecology of mind **(“If I am right, the whole thinking about what we are and what other people are has got to be restructured”;** 468), ideas that at **once problematize any distinction between inside and outside** and that make him dubious of any thought that presupposes sovereign subjectivity, my interpolation of “social” in his formulation “a difference that makes a social difference” **shifts the emphasis somewhat by insisting on the always already sociohistoricity** of any possible knowledge. Bateson believed that his understanding of information and systems ecology promised a new mode of thinking that he himself, as a twentieth-century bourgeois white man, did not feel capable of really embodying. Thus our interpolation, in keeping with Bateson but made compatible with Marx is, in keeping with Marx, designed to “transform ... the problem of knowledge into one of social theory” (Postone 2003: 216). Such a transformation **situates knowledge and now also information in the sociohistorical milieu**, the ecology such that it is, of racial capitalism, and therein finds information’s historical conditions of possibility. Here we advance the argument for the ultimately determining instance of social difference (and up the ante for the bet against whiteness) by **proposing that information is the elaboration of real abstraction**, of abstraction that results from collective practices of economic exchange and therefore from the general management of value as a social relation. I argue that set out in logical sequence, information is posited by, then posits and then presupposes the human processes of exchange that Sohn-Rethel, following Marx, argues are the practices that first give rise to the money- form and to real abstraction. For Sohn-Rethel the result of the activities of comparison, adequation, and trading of specific things that have qualities— which are, strictly speaking, incomparable—resulted over time in a process of finding a relation of equivalence and then general equivalence indexed to abstract labor time, what was in effect socially average human labor time. Exchange-value was a quantitative measure of that abstract time—the average socially necessary time to create commodity X denominated in money. This real abstraction was no one’s invention but was the practical result of exchange—of people’s activity—and thus emerged as a nonconscious result that nonetheless interceded on conscious process. Consequently, real abstraction was for Sohn-Rethel also the precursor to conceptual abstraction, including philosophy, science and mathematics. He writes: **The essence of commodity abstraction, however, is that it is not thought-induced**; it does not originate in ~~men’s~~(people’s) minds but in their actions. And yet this **does not give “abstraction” a merely metaphorical meaning. It is abstraction in its precise, literal sense.** The economic concept of value resulting from it is characterized by a complete absence of quality, a differentiation purely by quantity and by applicability to every kind of commodity and service which can occur on the market. These qualities of the economic value abstraction indeed display a striking similarity with fundamental categories of quantifying natural science without, admittedly, the slightest inner relationship between these heterogeneous spheres being as yet recognizable. While **the concepts of natural science are thought abstractions, the economic concept of value is a real one**. It exists nowhere other than in the human mind but it does not spring from it. Rather it is purely social in character, arising in the spatio-temporal sphere of human interrelations. It is not people who originate these abstractions but their actions. “They do this without being aware of it.”5 The practical rise of a form of abstraction indifferent to particular qualities is key here and is to be understood as a precursor to the content- indifferent abstractions of a variety of types. As Simmel notes in The Philosophy of Money, law, intellectuality, and money “have the power to lay down forms and directions to which they are content indifferent” (441–2). Without doubt, such power informed the racial categories of the Humanism of Ernst Renan, Roger Caillois, and others so brilliantly excoriated by Aimé Césaire in his Discourse on Colonialism. We add here the hypothesis that **the rise of information as the content-indifferent assignation of numerical index to any social relation** whatever, is a development of the abstraction necessary for economic exchange to persist under the intensive “developmental” pressure of global racial capitalism—information is derived from the increasingly complex things that people do through and as exchange and as such is both precursor and corollary to financialization— **the social conditions that sustain what is fetishistically apprehended as “finance capital”** and its seeming capacity to derive wealth from pure speculation and risk management in ways that (incorrectly) appear to be fully detached from labor and labor time. In this light, information reveals itself as **neither naturally occurring nor the creation of anyone in particular**, but, in keeping with Sohn-Rethel’s Marxian formulation of real abstraction, is likewise invented “**behind our backs” as a result of ~~“man’s”~~ “People’s” practical activity**. Information enables a complexification and further generalization of what will turn out to be monetary media, media that would be adequate to, and indeed are adequate (from the perspective of capital) to contemporary forms of exchange—what people do when they interact with one another in what is now the social factory. In brief, information is the extension of a monetary **calculus adequate to the increasingly abstract character of social relations and social exigencies**. It is an interstitial, materially platformed, calculative fabric of abstraction that through its coordinated capillary actions orchestrates social practice and provides interface for the uptake of value production. Once this idea is fully grasped, it becomes pointless to look for any other origin to the information age. Just as for Marx there is not a single atom of matter in exchange value (1990: 138), we say that there is not a single atom of matter in information.6 “All the phenomenon of the universe, whether produced by the hand of man or indeed by the universal laws of physics, are not to be conceived as acts of creation but solely as a reordering of matter” (Pietro Verri 1771, cited in Marx 1990: 133; note 13). Value is the socially valid informing of matter, so too is information. Economy then is society’s matter compiler and, approximately simultaneously with the advent of “man,” “history,” and “the world market,” “exchange value” emerges as a quantitative measure of the social value of material state changes indexed to human labour posited as “abstract universal labour time.” Marx’s famous example of the simple wooden table in Chapter 1 of Capital, which “transcends sensuousness” when leaving the clear-cut framework of use value and becoming a commodity and thus an exchange value, registers as “fetishism,” the “metaphysical subtleties,” “theological niceties,” and “grotesque ideas” (1990: 163), endemic in the table’s computability as value. In brief, just as **discreet states of matter embodying value as a network of commodities** mediated by markets and tied to labor give rise historically to the discrete state machine, otherwise known as the computer, exchange value gives rise to computable information and then to computation itself, becoming interoperable with it. Even before the rise of information proper, **exchange value operates as information** (and thus, necessarily information processing) —and then, as synthetic finance and contemporary forms of computer- mediated accounting and production readily testify, by means of it. Computation is the extension, development, **and formalization of the calculus of exchange value**—the ramification of its fetish character—and becomes in spirit and in practice, a **command control layer for the management of the profitable calculus of value**. Platformed on states of matter, information, not matter but rather difference between and among states of matter, extends, grammartizes, and granularizes the calculus of value regarding the organization of matter. **Commodities and computation thus run the same basic operating system**—state changes in matter driven by human practices—the value of which in any given state is expressed in the context of an informatic network and indexed to labor time. As such, information is the processing power of money itself and is inexorably beholden to abstract labor time and thus to racial capitalism. It is, in brief, an outgrowth of the money form. The cost of computation, the **arrival at a discrete state, is a derivative operation**, indicating an investment, that is explicitly a risk on the future value of an underlier, that is, on value itself. This argument for understanding the social as the ultimate referent and ground for any and all information, further advanced in chapter 1, is not content to serve **as a mere heuristic for cultural theorists to express a modicum of suspicion** with respect to truth claims backed by statistics and information. It is a **thoroughgoing indictment of information as a technique of value extraction**, racialization, and instrumental social differentiation. As a first approximation, actually existing information, like actually existing money, can indeed be said to be the root of all evil—in as much as the fact of its existence is a symptom of a far more complex historical process than what would seem to be discernible from the fact of the coin or the bit. The problem, of course, is that your metabolism (and mine), cannot easily extend into the future without access to both. I develop this idea here to say that everywhere computation operates, so too does racial capitalism—at least until proven otherwise. The repressive apparatus of capital clearly assumes this role for information, even if it does so at a level that most often exceeds ordinary default “human” (white) understanding: **the net result to date of the number crunch of “the world computer**” is a hierarchy of valuations inseparable from the violence of racialization and its attendant dispossession, and inseparable again from what Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007: 28) in her classic and statistically attuned definition of racism calls “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group- differentiated vulnerability to premature death.” Today, we argue, no calculation**, networked as it is with the world computer, is fully separable from informatics and its basis in racial capitalism.** We will argue for this logical and also horrific history of abstraction in more detail below as we explore the interoperability of digital systems and their colonization of the semiotic, corporeal and material domains. The global learning curve of revolutionary praxis must attend to this modal innovation of systemic oppression, an oppression which is at once beyond all calculation and one with it.7

#### This results in a *computational unconscious* – proletarianization has caused thought to be conscripted into the *vast automaton* of the World Computer, producing both the *subject* and *machine* as a vital organ of computational racial capitalism.

Beller 21, professor of Humanities and Media Studies and Critical and Visual Studies at the Pratt Institute (Jonathan, “The Computational Unconscious: Technology as a Racial Formation” in *The World Computer: Derivative Conditions of Racial Capitalism*, Duke University Press p. 65-68)--js

The idea of the “computational unconscious” allows us to propose that much contemporary consciousness (“virtuosity” in post-Fordist parlance, but also the Jamesonian “waning of affect” that indicated a generalized flattening of affective ground precisely and remarkably at the moment when affect studies began their rise to prominence) is a computational effect—in short, a species of artificial intelligence. Our thought is AI (the reader may here place the words our and thought in quotation marks as they see fit). A large part of what “we” are has been conscripted, even as “thought” and other allied metabolic processes are functionalized in lockstep service to the ironclad movements of code. This conscription is part of what Paolo Virno (2004:11) calls “the communism of capital,” or what Guy Debord (1995) calls “the false community of the spectacle,” under which social differences are exacerbated and exploited on the one side (labor/production) and shed and sheared away through the subsumption of these differences in the universal value-form on the other side (accumulation/capital). While ironclad is now a metaphor and code is less the factory code described by Marx and more the computer code of the deterritorialized factory of the silicon-driven screen, recognizing that the logic of industrial machinery and the bureaucratic structures of the corporation and the state have been abstracted and absorbed by discrete state machines—to the point where in some quarters “code is law”—will allow us to pursue a surprising corollary: The structural inequalities endemic to capital production—categories that often appear under variants of the analog signs of race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, and so on—are also deposited and thus operationally disappeared into our machines. Nonetheless they continue to do their work.

Put simply and perhaps, in deference to contemporary attention spans, too soon: our machines are racial formations. They are also technologies of gender and sexuality.3 Computation, as an extension of capitalism, is thus necessarily racial capitalism, the longue durée digitization of the logic and logistics of racialization—as well as, not in any way incidentally, of regimes of gender and sexuality. In other words, the inequality and structural violence inherent in capitalism also inhere in the logistics of computation that process economic production and exchange and that consequently also inhere in the real-time organization of semiosis, which is to say, our practices and our thought. The “servility” of consciousness, remunerated or not, aware of its underlying operating system or not, is organized in relation not just to sociality understood as interpersonal interaction in the footprint of the master-slave dialectic but in relation to digital logics of capitalization and machine-technics in service of the same master-slave relations. For this reason, the political analysis of post-modern and, indeed, posthuman inequality must examine the materiality of the computational unconscious. That, at least, is the hypothesis, for if it is the function of computers to automate thinking, and if dominant thought is the thought of domination, then what exactly has been automated?

Already in the 1850s the worker appeared to Marx as a “conscious organ” in the “vast automaton” (1990 [1867]: 502) of the industrial machine, and by the time he wrote the first volume of Capital Marx was able to comment on the worker’s new labor of “watching the machine with his eyes and correcting its mistakes with his hands” (1990: 496). Marx’s prescient observation with respect to the emergent role of visuality in capitalist production, along with his understanding that the operation of industrial machinery posits and presupposes the operation of other industrial machinery, suggests what was already implicit if not fully generalized in the analysis: that Dr. Ure’s notion, cited by Marx, of the machine as a “vast automaton,” was scalable—smaller machines, larger machines, or entire factories could be thus conceived, and, with the increasing scale and ubiquity of industrial machines, the notion could well describe the industrial complex as a whole. Historically considered, “watching the machine with his eyes and correcting the mistakes with his hand” thus appears as an early description of what information workers such as you and me would do on our screens. To extrapolate: distributed computation—its integration with industrial process and the totality of social processes—suggests that not only has society as a whole become a vast automaton profiting from the metabolism of its conscious organs but that, furthermore, the confrontation or interface with the machine at the local level (“where we are”) is an isolating and phenomenal experience that, while still a form of work, is not equivalent to the perspective of the vast automaton or, under capitalism, the perspective of capital. Given that here, while we might still be speaking about intelligence, we are not necessarily speaking about subjects in the strict sense; we might replace Althusser’s relation of S-s (Big Subject [God, the State, etc.] to small subject [“you” who are interpellated with and in ideology]) with AI-ai (Big Artificial Intelligence [the world system as organized by computational racial capital, or, the world computer] little artificial intelligence [“you,” as organized by the same]). “Yes, it is really me—an entrepreneur of the self.” Here subjugation is not necessarily intersubjective, and it does not require “mutual” recognition. The AI does not need to speak your language even if it is your operating system. With this in mind (haha), we may at once understand from our own experience that the space-time regimes of subjectivity (point-perspective, linear time, realism, individuality, discourse function, etc.) that once were part of the digital armature of “the human,” have been profitably shattered, and that the fragments have been multiplied and redeployed under the requisites of new management. We might wager that these outmoded templates or protocols for meaning and care despite their cannibalization by the ruling borg may still also meaningfully refer to an affective register that can take the measure of historical change—if only for some kind of species-remainder whose value is simultaneously immeasurable, unknown, and hanging in the balance among the various futures. Is there a meme for that?

Ironically perhaps, given the progress narratives attached to technical advances and the attendant advances in capital accumulation, Marx’s hypothesis—in chapter 15 of Capital, “Machinery and Large-Scale Industry” (1990: 563)—that “it would be possible to write a whole history of the inventions made since 1830 for the purpose of providing capital with weapons against working-class revolt,” casts an interesting light on the history of computing and its creation and imposition of new protocols of relation. (We are perhaps only now, as I put the finishing touches on this book begun many years ago, seeing rebellion that will challenge these.) Let us say from the moment Charles Babbage, inventor of modern computing, wanted to use a steam engine to drive calculations once thought to be possible only in the domain of thought, computing emerges as such a weapon against working-class revolts—delimiting and channeling pathways to community and/or liberation such that they are always rendered productive for capital. Computing absorbs the intelligence of labor and sets it against labor. As Matteo Pasquinelli puts it, “Babbage provided not just a labor theory of the machine but a labor theory of machine intelligence. Babbage’s calculating engines (‘intelligent machines’ of the age) were an implementation of the analytical eye of the factory’s master. Cousins of Bentham’s panopticon, they were instruments, simultaneously, of surveillance and measurement of labor. It is this idea that we should consider and apply to the age of artificial intelligence and its political critique, although reversing its polarization, in order to declare computing infrastructure a concretion of labor in common” (Pasquinelli 2019: 54).

Not only have the incredible innovations of workers been abstracted and absorbed by machinery from the earliest moments of industrialization; so also have many of their myriad antagonisms toward capitalist dominations—all roads have lead to capital, or almost. Machinic perfection meant the imposition of continuity and the removal of “the hand of man” by fixed capital or, in other words, the absorption of know-how and the foreclosure of many forms of disruption—both by means of automation (Marx 1990: 502). Thus the repression of individual moments of resistance to mechanization and computation, the disciplinary aspect of production and reproduction, results socially in a generalized repression of the understanding of machine intelligence as the alienation of the general intellect. This repressed history of domination results in a symptomatic fetishism around AI that indicates the unknown history of this alienation—the computational unconscious.

#### Readings of disability get integrated into capitalism --- corporations would love to incorporate people with disabilities in the work force

Mitchell and Snyder 2010 (David T, Temple University, and Sharon L, Independent Scholar, “Introduction: Ablenationalism and the Geo-Politics of Disability,” *Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies* 4.2, 2010, pages 113–126)spaldwin

Alternatives to Consumptive Lives

By and large the disability professions determine that disabled populations merit rescue from labor force exclusions through the enactment of anti-discrimination policies and the provision of near-subsistence level medical and social services. Within these neo-liberal intervention strategies disabled bodies are relegated to the ranks of surplus employment that may indeed drive labor costs down. Yet, at the same time the particularities of bodily accommodations necessarily send people with disabilities into circulation as consumers of medical and social services assistance. This entry of disabled “consumers” into market systems becomes an odd and nuanced affair in that the basis of those classified as consumers usually requires “purchasing power,” the one thing that the majority of disabled people do not possess.

Furthermore, and perhaps most to the purposes of understanding disability experience from the inside out, is the demand to circulate as a paradigmatic patient–consumer with significant needs. Efforts to operate in this circuit of basic creature needs results in bureaucratic onslaughts of other creatures’ rights to determine the coordinates of one’s care, supports, inclusion, reproductive life, value, and, perhaps, accompanied by low-level treatment, as one whose payment is actually debated and negotiated among third parties (such as medical service organizations, assistive technology suppliers, and insurance companies). At the utopian end of progressive democracy, self-pay policy initiatives without remunerated labor power constitute the luxury addendum to this order of things, whether in the form of “money follows the person” or enrollment on a regular “dole” under social-democratic regimes. Within the interstices of the geo-politics of Disability Studies we become all too aware that urgent questions of wartime economies and the perpetual resort by governments to declarations of a state of emergency quickly displace even the acute phases of peacetime negotiations among groups seeking to secure necessary augmentative equipment.

The advent of disability, then, plays a critical role in predominantly aesthetic efforts to represent the nation as synonymous with a narrow array of acceptable body types. Bodies that function across a range of variations are characterized by their possession of a fluid, adaptive ease among inflexible, human-made environments. Puar names this set of relations “assemblage,” in the sense that the emphasis moves from an additive concept of devalued essences encountered in theories of intersectionality to a locus of interchanges and exclusions (174). In recent theories of corporeality highlighted by social theorists of the body such as Eve Sedgwick, Elizabeth Grosz, and Brian Massumi, environments are sculpted by corporeal creativity as much as they deterministically channel expressions into acceptable circuits of hetero-normative outputs. Their work collectively provides some tools that Disability Studies may adopt for ways to recognize the active give-and-take between the virtual (prosthetic) and organismic (affective) as they constitute sites of promise for cultural renewal rather than merely yielding further examples of social determinism (what Sedgwick calls the products of “paranoid criticism” [125] and Massumi refers to as “the cultural solipsism” of constructivism [39]).

Likewise, in Disability Studies, while the national body displays generic characteristics of race, gender, sexuality, class, and ability, its analysis has more often than not given way in Cultural Studies to further entrenchments of embodied difference as truly needy and indicative of real inferiority. Disabled bodies have had a tendency to fall short of modernity’s lowest qualification bar of citizenship as an unsalvageable biological—rather than socially produced— deviancy. Their incapacities render them too objectionable to be understood as unfairly barred from citizenship as opposed to justifiably relegated to special class options. The contributors to this special issue wrestle with formative theoretical tendencies to write off disability as yet another constructed phenomenon while not losing track of alternative opportunities to re-value disability. Within these approaches are some key models for articulating disability experiences as potential escape routes out of—or, at least, as alternatives to—the fashionable linguistic and aesthetic straightjackets social constructivism has produced to date.

One might be led to think that within rubrics of undervaluation, disabled populations find themselves marginalized at the outskirts of cultural power. Yet, recent able-nationalisms—those open rhetorical claims of a new era of inclusion for people with disabilities issued by the state—have situated some mutant bodies as effectively and normatively disabled. Disabled people now perform their representational work as a symbol of expansive neo-liberal inclusion efforts: a largely rhetorical space that operates by what Susan Koshy defines for racial and ethnic minorities as “a simulacrum of inclusiveness even as it advances a political culture of market individualism that has legitimized the gutting of social services” and supports while retaining commitment to the integration of its most vulnerable (special) citizens (3).

We may think of efforts in late January, 2010, by the U.S., Britain, and Canada to send cast-off prosthetic items such as artificial legs and arms, wheelchairs, crutches, and walkers to Haiti on behalf of the “scores of newly disabled.” In the wake of an earthquake that resulted in massive social and structural upheaval, CNN’s Dr. Sanjay Gupta explained to audiences that the “loss of a leg” was tantamount to a “death sentence” in the decimated country. Such observations were obligatorily accompanied by off-hand editorials about the insufficiency of Haiti’s health care system before the earthquake, as if a negligent healthcare infrastructure was ultimately to blame for the number of individuals experiencing the devastation of crush wounds resulting in widespread amputations. Consequently, the donations of disabled people and families (presumably more than adequately taken care of in their own lands) would turn their excess equipment into the accoutrements of Haiti’s regained mobility and the future ascendancy of a more modern, western-style, healthcare system. This display of disability largesse is an example of the kind of American exceptionalism whereby provisions are assumed to be excessive for institutionalized disabled people. The inadequacies of distribution of assistive technology and equipment are erased in Anglophone countries through a sort of Malthusian denial of the rampant rejection rates characteristic of insurance industries on behalf of people with disabilities.

In the popular sphere of product advertisements, disabled bodies are now ubiquitously referenced in commercials for myriad pharmaceuticals, prosthetically engineered bodies and minds, mutating organisms that may be better adapted for a future world yet to come. Disabled people have become increasingly engendered by systems (and long, boring hours) of scientific observation, classification, and taxonomy, the predication of data, detail, and description leading to the micro-management of information and bodies, all in the attempt to render the world a knowable object in the most Foucauldian sense.

Those of us who find ourselves living with significant levels of socially classified aberrancy, and, we might add, over extended periods of a life-span, have metamorphosed into the equivalent of something no longer kin to a giant Kafkaesque beetle like Gregor Samsa with more than adequate justification for our own self loathing. Gracing a poster for the Emotion Pictures Disability Film Festival held in 2006 in Athens, Greece, was a photograph of the double-amputee athlete, Amy Mullins, speeding across a beach with her artificial legs powered by resplendent coils. The image proved indicative of a new era of disabled athleticism—buffed, muscular, yet technologically supplemented bodies—promising all of the transcendent capacity a hyper-medicalized culture could offer.

The image that year was paralleled by other forms of “positive and affirming” kinds of disability popularly narrated in the cultural lineage of the X‑Men who have significant—even severe—incapacities but also harbor extra-human compensatory abilities. Compensation—or, rather, schemes of superpower overcompensation—rule the roost of neo-liberal explanatory systems. Such systems enshrine those bodies different yet enabled enough to ask nothing of their crumbling, obstruction-ridden infrastructure, continually naturalized as environments made for most but (unfortunately) not all bodies. Enhanced supercrips are celebrated by capitalist commodity cultures and communist governments alike as symbols of the success of systems that further marginalize their “less able” disabled kin in the shadow of committed researchers conjoined to “creaming” practices for the non-impaired impaired.

This special issue, The Geopolitics of Disability, analyzes trans-mobile and UN rights-based optimism for the decade of disabled people, suggesting that we all put our attention to a time/space of scholarship and reality-testing combined with a dose of judicious caution. Like Paul Gilroy’s identification of the black, buffed, hyper-athletic bodies of African American athletes now commodified and traded across the Atlantic, the newly rehabilitated, fetishized disabled body comes replete with racialized, classed, gendered, and sexualized characteristics of its own—features that seem to make new inclusivism a radically individualist and ever-accomplishable horizon for disabled subjects. Following Puar’s formula of “upright homosexuals engaged in sanctioned kinship roles,” we suggest a fierce study of this new trans-national bolstering of crip normativities—the able disabled—in order to seek out, maintain, and even challenge the transgressive alterities of former multicultural identities. In this task, we would reference local sites of affiliation and resistance among and across those who define their chief life difference as manifest in the experience of disabilities.

Specifically with reference to burgeoning theories of globality (the tactics, strategies, and logistical maneuverings of multi-national capitalism), this special issue seeks to recognize as well as critique the recent global entry of disabled persons (as spoken by and for the World Bank, UCF, UN, and transnational citizen representative politics), overlapping with their traditional representation (by local and national charity interest-groups). The International Classification of Functioning (ICF) forms a crucial methodological and linguistic bridge between these diverse, disparate multi-national organizations that oversee, channel, and mitigate between disabled bodies. Thus, the price of recent efforts to fold disability into the life of the nation might prove quite steep—both for those disabled subjects who aspire to find themselves comfortably ensconced among the normatively disabled, while forgetting those who decline or the multitudes denied entry due to the undesirability of their bodies as they seek to immigrate across national borders, maneuver into professions, or even qualify as truly impaired in quest of high-profit physician industry signatures that certify the real terms of one’s impaired status.

For instance, rather than researching effective intervention practices, professional fields such as Occupational Therapy now spend time researching the qualities of the potentially successful disabled rehab patient before they ever seek to provide assistance in spearing a can of peas off the shelf or white caning it to the local bus stop. This pre-emptive evaluation allows the professional disability fields to avoid “wasting time” on those likely to drop out as failed rehab subjects ahead of time—the equivalent of a pre-emptive strike toward potential disabled participants in the care professions. It also helps stave off a necessary internal disciplinary critique that might have to wonder why many disabled people find the therapies so unfulfilling to their overall life goals.

The Geo-Politics of Disability offers an opportunity for scholars to pursue a new paradigm for theorizing disability among other cross-cultural experiences of bodies identified as deviant. The issue marks the important emergence of disabled subjectivities into the marketplace and the interstices of state benevolence. Neo-liberal discourses of power involve the production of “inclusive” lifestyles that provide opportunities for narratives of national exceptionalism based on a new era of humane treatment of people with disabilities. Such developments provide a glance at the normativized disabled subject and an accompanying normalization of deviancy.

Furthermore, this normalization of some disabilities is created against other non-normative, less easy to accommodate differences (neuro-diverse people, mental retardation, intersexed peoples, and those with communication-based disabilities). This process, of the normalization of disability, referred to by Lennard Davis as “dismodernism”—the idea that postmodernism entails a recognition that we are all disabled to some extent—undermines our ability to pay attention to abject populations peripheral to the project of living. There is not a level playing field that all bodies occupy, and calling for all to recognize levels of insufficiency will do little to accomplish meaningful systems change. This is the global underbelly of a disability phenomenon equivalent to what Mbembe calls “necropolitics” with regard to the expendability of populations where race, class, sexuality, and gender intersect.

#### The category of disability is a neoliberal logic of inclusion that fails at challenging the structure of debility which is produced through the system of racial capitalism

Puar 17, professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at Rutgers University and the author of Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. (Jasbir K. Puar, “The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability.” Duke University Press, 2017. Pages 75-78)

In the more than twenty-five years since the passage and implementation of the ada, it has become evident that one of its shortcomings is that it uses capitalist logic to solve a problem largely created by capitalism. It mistakes the demands for greater incorporation into economic circuits of productivity as a tacit acceptance of current structures of laboring and workplace conditions, and transposes and thus dilutes a systemic critique of structures of employment into a liberal identity politics focused on inclusion and recognition. It ironically desires assimilation of people with disabilities into some of the very structures that debilitated them initially: potentially hazardous working conditions, not the least of which includes work in the military.39 The ada does not so much challenge prevalent constructions of the organization of labor that might be debilitating as it minoritizes the otherwise inadequate labor contributions of bodies deemed disabled by insisting on their incorporation into work spaces that are modified especially for them. The changes are to access to workplaces but not to workplaces in general, treating disability as another hindrance to social mobility that must be resolved, rather than a facet of life that might tell us something about failures of how time and labor and space are organized. Further, it should be noted that the ada does not address the practices of debilitation manifested by U.S. policy elsewhere. The convergence of the passage of the ada and the beginning of the first Gulf War in 1991 surely merits deeper consideration.40 The ada is in part the victory of the long-term activist efforts of war-injured veterans, only to be followed by more warring activities that debilitate populations of the U.S. military as well as civilians in Iraq. Countering accommodationist models, Marta Russell and Ravi Malhotra argue for an understanding of disability grounded in anticapitalist critique rather than in liberal models of recognition, rights, tolerance, and acceptance. Noting that the “‘minority’ model of disability . . . views it as the product of a disabling social and architectural environment,” they write: “In contrast, we take the view that disability is a socially-created category derived from labour relations, a product of the exploitative economic structure of capitalist society: one which creates (and then oppresses) the so-called ‘disabled’ body as one of the conditions that allow the capitalist class to accumulate wealth. Seen in this light, disability is an aspect of the central contradiction of capitalism.”41 In the view of Russell and Malhotra, then, centralizing people with disabilities demands a radical reenvisioning of laboring, a transformation in the temporal pulse and spatial determinations of capitalism.42 Bodies deemed disabled bear the burden of displaying what is exploitative about the organization of labor, staking a claim in the “end of capitalism.”43 Forms of “peripheral embodiment,” they imply, are neither exceptional nor peripheral; they do not defy or challenge the norm. Rather, the periphery exposes the perceived norm as a fantasy of the social.44 In fact, the debilitated laboring body is a constitutive and endemic facet of the normative functioning of capitalist exploitation. Neoliberal investments in the body as portfolio, as site of entrepreneurship, entail transition of some disabled bodies from the disciplinary institutions of containment, quarantine, and expulsion into forms of incorporative biopolitical control. David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder argue that “disabled people have shifted from modernity’s exception (a line of defect to be isolated and eradicated) to postmodernist [neoliberal] exceptionality (failing bodies resuscitated by an increasingly medicalized state). In this latter state, the ontology of disability retrieves a formerly fallen object and makes it newly available for cultural rehabilitation,” a euphemism for producing cultural docility.45 Mitchell and Snyder track this shift of people with disabilities located from “a former era of economic burden” of paternalistic, institutional, and welfare regimes when disabled people were “social pariahs,” to what they term “objects of care” that impel the investment of service economies and neoliberal strategies of intervention and rehabilitation—“a ‘hot’ ticket item for potential research and funding schemes.”46 Mitchell and Snyder’s claim situates the disabled body as the site of extreme productivity—and thus, profitability—precisely through its lack of conventional productive laboring value. Once excluded from the labor system because of their “unproductivity,” disabled bodies have become the “sites for the exercise of the primitive accumulation that fuels capitalism.”47 This productivity is thus not “measured by his or her ability to produce goods and services that satisfy social/human needs,” as Erevelles points out, but rather “based solely on capitalist exploitative demands for increasing profit.”4 And yet, despite this profitability, Mitchell and Snyder argue that the disabled non/laborer is also a resistant non-capacitated body, implicitly challenging the incomplete liberal project of docility by refusing to assimilate into a laboring capacity. In echoing Russell and Malhotra’s conviction that disability reveals a central contradiction, a paradox even, of capitalism, Mitchell and Snyder laud Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s rerouting from the worker as the paradigmatic resistant subject in Marxist theory to “living labor” or “non-productive bodies,” as the nascent site of dissent. No longer able to locate a single site of resistance to capitalism in a “simple, agonistic division of labor,” Mitchell and Snyder ask, “Where does resistance manifest itself once a concept of the workers’ revolution no longer seems tenable and how will this resistance govern itself without the institution of new hierarchies of inequality?”49 In other words, the undermining of capitalism will come from those who cannot or will not work, from those whose “capacities make them ‘unfit’ for labor.”50 This unfitness, they argue, proves “imminently productive” because these bodies inhabit and generate alternative biopolitical scripts of consumption, family, and nation.51 They evidence this assertion by averring that “the disabled people that we know are some of the worst consumers on the planet because they have neither the means, the interest, nor the gullibility of mistaking meaning with market . . . disabled artists in the U.S. live some of the most sparingly nonconsumptive lives and, yet, this is what we admire about them the most.”52

#### The alternative is refusal – epistemological intervention is a prerequisite to alternatives to capitalism – their academic investments inevitably reproduce capitalist strategies

Beller 21 (Jonathan Beller = Professor of Humanities and Media Studies and Critical and Visual Studies at Pratt Institute, “Introduction:  The Social Difference Engine and the World Computer,” in *The World Computer: Derivative Conditions of Racial Capitalism*, Duke University Press, pp. 183-189 BEH)

Given the sea change in the nature of **languages and images** themselves— their wholesale transposition and transformation from a means of **representation to a means of production**— the difficulty here is both with the substrate of communication (its bits) and with the us- versus- them perspective: we want to ban advertisers, but today we must also confront the disturbing possibility that we are them. Remember, “they” **program** “our” language and “our” imagination, “we” speak **“their” thought**— indeed, that is our work, or rather our labor. What to do with the fact that “we have seen the enemy and he is us?” One could say, one could want to say, “I don’t care who you are: if you live in the first world, if you live in the Global North, then fuck you! You ain’t no victim, even if you’re sick.” But who would be saying that? Probably some other Northerner, writing about how culture or the Venice Biennale, as if it were, could or should be more than a lavish spectacle of global suffering staged for a cosmopolitan elite. As capital’s nations, banks, armies, schools, languages, newspapers, and films did to its colonies and colonial subjects, the current **institutions from states to computer**- media companies do to “us”: they command us to make ourselves over **in capital’s image** for their own profit through networked strategies of **expropriation and dispossession**. “We” do it to ourselves, and our representations of **self and other are designed to sell** a version of ourselves back to ourselves so that we can perform further work on what is now the raw material for the next iteration of images. Therein lies our ontological lack, an ontological lack of solidarity and of even the possibility for solidarity. Therein lies the desire for and indeed necessity **to become a plantation manager** — the word is overseer. Though it is beyond the scope of this essay, this digital neocolonialism that practically commands global Northerners to in one way or another accept Nazism and genocide with their cappuccino could be understood as being on a continuum with the internal colonization of Europe by the German banks— which depends of course on the **distributed production of a kind of neoliberal “realism**” that Mark Fisher (2009) called “**capitalist realism,”** and was only ever a hair’s breadth away from fascism. This fact of our investment in and by advertising, the conversion of the sign to what I call the “advertisign,” poses a genuine problem for theory— indeed an unprecedented one. This problem is particularly evident considering the material conditions (class, nationality, education, race, language, et c.) of the participants in the would-be counterhegemonic theoretical discussions of culture and policy that presuppose the books, computers, schools, and institutions that sustain these. Those within the circuit of these discussions have already passed through a homogenization process which **programs them in compatible systems languages**. **Without submitting ourselves** and our own aspirations to radical critique, without conducting a Gramscian inventory of our ostensibly internal constitutions, we run the risk of merely trying to set up a **competing corporation** with a new business model. The revolution will not **be televised**; decolonization **will not be a brand.** Any would-be anticapitalist “we” runs this risk of coopting and cooptation from the get-go, particularly if it does not think about the materiality of **social production** from top to bottom: class, yes, but also race, nation, gender, sexuality, ability, geolocation, historical stratification. The world’s postmodern poor, the two billion– plus living on two dollars a day, also lab or to survive in the material landscape organized by the post- Fordist social factory its **anti- Blackness, its Islamophobia, its endless and mutating racism** and imperialism. However, from the standpoint of capital, **the role of those at the bottom is to serve as substrate** for image- production and semiosis; not only in factories, cottage- industries, subsistence farming, and informal economies, but also as starving Advertisarial Relationshordes; “irrational,” criminalized or surplused populations; subject- objects for policing, encampment, and bombing; desperate refugees; and even as voids in the idea of the world—as sites of social death. Forgive me, but I’d wager that no one capable of understanding these words can claim full exemption from the indictment they issue regarding structural complicity with the production and reproduction of everyday life. Humans **are troped (via discourse and the screen) to organize military production**, national policy, internment camps and prisons, bourgeois imaginations, museum shows, corporate strategy, and market projections. Let us clearly state here that **any program** that does not admit this excluded **planet into dialogues** **that vitiate** the **monologues imposed by capitalist** informatics and advertisigns is still floating in the realm of the ruling ideas **and therefore participant in murder.** These ruling ideas are the ones whose density and weight, whose material support and very machinery, threaten to further crush the late- capitalist poor out of not just representation but out of existence. This erasure and disposability, imposed by systems of informatic inscription designed to absorbe very output of sense, is the achievement of the advertisarial relations endemic to computational racial capitalism. When information is an advertisement for itself that presupposes the operating system of the world computer as virtual machine, **banning what we recognize as advertising on the internet, even if an excellent beginning,** is just not adequate to address these issues of representation, social justice, planetary and climate racism, and emancipation. To summarize: the forms of sociality which are the conditions of possibility for the online, informatically organized r elations— best characterized as advertisarial — run through e very sector and register of planetary life. The internet, while recognizable as an effect and a cause of the current form of **planetary production and reproduction**, cannot be considered in isolation as a **merely technical platform or set of platforms if its historical role is to be properly understood.** To take the internet as an autonomous technological force results in a species of platform **fetishism that disavows both the histories and material conditions** of its emergence, conditions that are, in short, those of screen culture and racial capitalism; this is to say that it, the internet, is the very means by which the capitalist suppression of global democracy (which is emphatically, economic democracy as well) has been accomplished and continues. If the internet is autonomous, it is because it expresses the autonomization of the value form. As noted previously, **with the hijacking of communications** and **semiotic infrastructures** by racial capitalism, the medium is the message and **the message is murder.** To ban advertising on the internet would be a good start— but what if the whole thing is advertising? **One reading of** what I have said thus far might suggest that, giv**en the expropriation of the cognitive- linguistic, our volition is overtaken by capital logic;** and given our inability to cogitate in any way that is genuinely resistant to capitalist expropriation, coercion, strictly speaking, **is no longer necessary to impose cooperation for capitalist production.** We “want” to cooperate productively, our desire— which, from the dispossession of even language and mind constitutes ourselves as subjects in the media ecology of the capital is t technical image, that is, in and through the organization of digital information—**is itself an iteration of capital, a script of becoming predestined to become capital**. The old language scored by the new image machines and their extractive algorithms locally organizes cooperative subjects who want to cooperate with vectoral capitalization. **We want to provide content in order to derive currency and survive.** Our solidarity on the internet produces more internet. Thus, in a certain way— and particularly since **we no longer properly have any thoughts of our own—we all collaborate in a world organized by images and screens, thereby participating more or less mindlessly in the seamless realization and triumphant apotheosis of the programming business.** However, I am sorry to have to report that the dystopian vision **here is not quite as bucolic as even this** already dreary picture of unwitting and irredeemable pulverization and servitude. While I do see that representation and semiotics have been increasingly flattened à la Orwell and Marcuse by a vast internalization of the apparatuses of oppression ( in which “**thought” is the** [productive] thought **of the [capitalist**] Party and “**repressive desublimation**” is an engine of capitalist- fascist **production)** the “old problems” like the hierarchy of class have not gone away; neither have racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, and fascist nationalisms ceased playing their roles to create vectors of privilege for white male– identifying aspiration. Indeed, most thought today, such that it is, is all about maintaining hierarchical society. **The thinking runs thus**: capital is nature, capital is eternal, capital is information is nature. Or, in a more pedestrian mode: **human beings are naturally acquisitive and competitive**, economic growth and technological advancement mean progress, **this tech provides**, **or almost provides,** a color- , gender- , and religion- blind society, and so on— and one must advance one’s place in it by any (crypto- or not- s o- cryptofascist**) means necessary.** Of course, there exists better thinking out there. Mia Mingus: “As organizers, we need to think of access with an understanding of disability justice, moving away from an equality based model of sameness and ‘we are just like you’ to a model of disability that embraces difference, confronts privilege and challenges what is considered ‘normal’ on every front. We don ’t want to simply join the ranks of the privileged; we want to dismantle those ranks and the systems that maintain them” (Mingus 2011, cited in Puar 2017: 16). However, there is **broad- band, ambient programming that facilitates assuming neo- liberal** and full-on **fascist subjective sovereignty**. This programming seeks triumphant brushes with plenitude (communion with the big Other, as distinct from the racial or otherwise other, becomes the ego- ideal) , and this same programming is violent, competitive, hateful, mean- spirited, and alienating when embraced—at the same time that it is also cooperative, simpering, and abject. Servitude, even when automatic and mostly unconscious, is unhappy and, as we can see any day from the daily news, utterly pathological and sick. Of course, this diagnosis represents a huge generalization, but despite its broad-brushing lack of subtlety we may find that such a schizoid oscillation between entitled adjudicator and abject supplicant sums up the contours of your average reality televisions how or comments section on YouTube. It is Bateson’s (2000) and Deleuze and Guattari’s (1977) schizophrenic, caught in the double- bind, who has become the capitalist norm— the one who struggles to negotiate in the form of contradictory signals the aporias of hierarchical society, while reproducing it, and all the while experiencing their own psychic dissolution as an injunction to create. 3 With this schizoid capture in mind, let me then develop my question about the internet— “ What if it is all advertising?”—in the framework of post- Fordist production. The argument is that, in the context of virtuosity and the expropriation of the cognitive- linguistic by computational racial capital, sociality itself has become advertisarial, a ceaseless waging of capitalized exploits designed to garner attention and value for oneself and one’s capitalistic. This situation represents— indeed imposes— a derivative logic, a logic **in which every action** is a hedge, a kind of risk management devoted to maximize a return. In addition to the fractalization of fascism, in which agency is manifest as a profile that has aggregated the attention of others, advertising has worked its way into the sign itself, into the image, and into data visualization, and it has generated the advertising . All signs become points of potential cathexis, derivative positions on the underlier that is social currency and ultimately value. This new type of sign is not simply the brand but also an element of vectoral language (Wark 2007): functionalized words in a production channel, engaging in the micromanagement of desire, the production of new needs, and the capturing of the imagination, all in order to induce linguistic and behavioral shifts in the attention of others while aggregating their attention for oneself— t urning their heads with an interface. This combination of the manipulation of market conditions (that is, everyday life) through techniques of risk management is no longer merely the province of advertising but of so- called tuman interactivity 188 Chapter 4(what was once just communication and before that culture), now become adversarial through and through. From Smythe’s claim in the “Blindspot” essay (1977) that all leisure time has become lab or time, to Virno’s (2004) notion of virtuosity, we have seen aspects of this model for the capitalist overdetermination of apparently unremunerated time before. However, here— with the financialization of expression—we clearly grasp that the financialization of everyday life means also the convergence of semiotics and financial derivatives. Given the thoroughgoing intensification of vectoral, and in fact matrixial, signs, we need to investigate its implications in the context of a discussion of radical media practice. I will make two additional points here before shifting gears and turning at the end of this chapter to what I identify as an aesthetics of survival—an aesthetics that emerges from within the matrix of adversarial, schizoid capture. The final chapter of this volume will endeavor to extend aspects of such socio aesthetic forms, those resistant to computational racial capitalism, to new notions of radical finance and the possibility of platform communism. If, as was already becoming true in the cinematic mode of production, the dominant means of representation have become the dominant means of production, the questions of and models for political agency are radically transformed, and the urgent need to decolonize communication and decolonize finance presents itself. Future communication will require a cybernetic approach, and, as wes hall argue, this cybernetic approach will necessarily be financial, though it will be reaching toward a different order and different mode of production. Like communism, because it will need to be communist, it will see economic transformation of the material relations of production and reproduction as essential to the revolution. It will draw on the repressed and extracted cognitive- linguistic resource of the racialized and other wise marginalized and configure ways to make our voices matter both as meaning and as tools for the reorginzation of the material world and the social relations therein prescribed. Language and images are neither inside nor outside; they are part of the general intellect— currently they are at once media of thought and of capital. We also know that languages and images are not isolable, meaning that they are not and have never been stand- alone entities but rather exist in relation to their media, their platforms, which are again inseparable from society and its institutions. Furthermore, each platform relates to another platform. Paraphrasing McLuhan, we could even say that the “content” of a media platform is another platform. Thusly the general intellect is inseparable from its media platforms and their financials. We see that the general intellect, once largely held in common, is increasingly being privatized; the very media of our thought belong to someone else . This expropriation of the media commons is precisely the precondition of the real subsumption of society 189 Advertisarial Relationsby capital. It is an extension of the ongoing expropriation begun by primitive accumulation and money as capital, and it has been accomplished through the financialization of media as platforms of extraction. The ramification of mediation by computation and information has resulted in its convergence into formats offering derivative exposure to underliers that are the expressive vitality and futurity of our communication. We therefore no longer have any organic relation to the materials for thought itself (sincerity has become a myth, at least in the medium- term of most circles)— t he words, images, and machines we require to think, to express ourselves, to interact, and to know have been ripped from the species and privatized via the longue durée of dissymmetrical exchange. We work on the words and images, but as numbers they belong to someone else. The media themselves have become forms of capital— forms of racial capital— and our usage of these media means that we work to add value that valorizes capital, for the capitalist and within a relation designed as much as possible to guarantee that our creative acts necessarily occur as dissymmetrical exchange with capital. I write this book in a discourse that does not just not belong to me because it is shared, but in a discourse that is increasingly the property of a set of institutions— publishers, journals, universities— that all have their eye on the bottom line. The means by which we most intimately know the world, ourselves, and our desires (our images and words) are themselves vectors of capitalization intent upon converting our very life- process into surplus value (which is to say value for capital). We need strategies that will seize the means of production and create a reverse subsumption of affect, intellect**, knowledge**, **capability, communication, and community.** When all media have converged as economic media, it is **economic media that must be re- engineered**. When all media have converged as economic media, it is economic media that must be re- engineered. Again, I think this subsumption of cognitive and affective capacity, the quasi-automating (scripting) of productive labor for capital, is what Stiegler means by the proletarianization of the nervous system—which would include the proletarianization of the pathways of feeling and thought. Our affective capacities are put to alienated and alienating work in the social factory, and their product too is alienated, producing ever-intensifying and ever-accumulating dispossession and disempowerment as the dialectical antithesis of its simultaneous production of unprecedented wealth and power for the cyborg avatars of the great media conglomerates. Intellect and emotional intelligence, the product of thousands of years of species- becoming, is being strip-mined so that extraction machines may continue their furious innovation to further discount people. I write this book aware of the pressure to think it just right, to at once extend thinking in order to command attention and produce new needs, but also to delimit it, to control myself, and to put the reins on whatever counterpower may rage within my body, because academia can tolerate only so much “bullshit” and no more. Yes sir, I’ll be careful not to cross that line, but a word to the woke: the bullshit is the best part. From a historical perspective, this encroachment on the means of representation—that Banksy and I and a billion others join the silenced majority in opposing—indicates that the individual subjective agent, itself a platform for sociality that developed with the rise of capitalism (as the subject who relates to other subjects in the market, the bearer of the commodity and thus its thought), is nearly **defunct.** As has been noted previously, in a world where life processes are stripped, ripped apart, rebundled, and sold as derivative exposures, the individual subject is an outmoded technology despite the fact that it still appears as a skeuomorph in certain updated technosocial apparatuses—like the latest forms of films, games, influencers, and versions of national politics that proffer invitations to momentary individualistic identification for the dividual purpose of providing a sense of familiarity and orientation. While palliative for some in small doses, such individuality is no longer a viable (which is to say, sustainable) fantasy. The real thought is that of the infrastructure, of the AI that codes our meat and scripts our sheets. Sure I take up the mantle for a few moments each day to appear as the agent of this text, suiting up as the operator of an intellect that might be adequate to the informatic shit-storm of racist, capitalist, imperialist, patriarchal, for-profit assaults, but then I drop off into an ocean of petty concerns, food shopping, and home repairs. And even when I say “I,” to perform as the nexus of all this insight, I also know that it’s hardly me talking. I’m just curating at the gates of shit that needs to be said, and hopefully titrating to let the right stuff through. That’s part of my politics though Dog knows that I could create a more lucrative named-professor type profile with just a little more discipline, a bit more self-interested adherence to the protocols of the academy’s factory code. Instead, there is the effort to overturn, to be or at least to live something beyond being the scribe of the world computer, to at once witness the drama of the emergence of the intelligence of commodification, testify to its outrage, and intimate the possibility of its overthrow. Such would be the art of this text, practiced at the limits of disciplinarity and of subjectivity, guaranteed by nothing and no one. The expiration of the subject form, imminent since the subject’s first intimation of mortality—and made structurally mandatory by Freud and especially, with the full-blown rise of the sign at the moment of it radical marginalization by visuality, by Lacan—is not necessarily a cause for lament, despite the increasingly intense fading of its incalculable beauty, its sad reduction to cliché. From a political perspective, it means that within each concrete individual body the presumed continuity of the individual is riddled with contradictory and indeed unassimilable indicators; it means also that there exists in differing quantities and qualities capitalist and noncapitalist striations or sectors. Hallways of emptiness, but also hallways of love. Like bundled assets, the mind-body is tranched by executable logics organized by a calculus of risk available to investors. There are, to be a bit simplistic, **aspects of desire that are** programmed (indeed farmed) to produce practices that function in perfect accord with capitalist accumulation strategies (individualizing or schizoid) and aspects of **desire that are atavistic or collectivist**, utopian, communist, or maybe even just plain lonely, and, in short, subprime. In reality, of course, desire is more singular than even such formalizations might indicate. Insert your favorite snippet of poetry here. Hortense Spillers in “All the Things You Could Be by Now If Sigmund Freud’s Wife Was Your Mother” (1997) invokes “the Dozens” and the music of and like that of Charles Mingus (152–3), to make present an “interior intersubjectivity”(140) testifying to the rich unaudited psychic life of what might today be called Blackness. There are vast resources beyond the easy resolution of hegemonic hermeneutics whether deployed by institutionally validated psychoanalysis or compressed by current systems of informatic extraction. In agreeing with Freud that consciousness makes up a small part of mental life when compared to the preconscious, the unconscious, dreams, and so on, but in rejecting the normative assumptions and disavowals (including his own Jewishness) that situate Freud and the psychoanalytic discourse that will become part of European and U.S. bourgeois society, Spillers recognizes a vast store of mental life and the possibility of listening anew. However, when speaking of politics now, we therefore necessarily speak of the abstract forms available for the conceptualization and deployment of concrete emergences whether referring to haecceities that are innumerable or collective forms of existence and psychic life actively mediating between “the one” and “the ‘masses’ ” (141). Let us listen anew. Acknowledging that we ultimately and if possible immediately want to “marry our thought” (Wynter 1994b: 65) to the wealth of subaltern forms of life and the care of the bios, allow me then to put the situation of the post- Fordist subject thusly: in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin (1939) showed how imperialist dividends complicated class issues in England, since many people, otherwise part of the working class, got a share of the dividends of imperialism by clipping the coupons of their investments in racist, exploitative British enterprises across the globe. Today this race-based class fractionalization is fully internalized in the Global North; on our iPads built by Chinese slaves from blood metals extracted from the Congo, we may momentarily feel like biomorphically unmarked nobles in the global cosmopolis; while on the job market or when simply seen in our raced and gendered embodiments, we are abjects. Materially and intellectually we are nodal points on a global network. The signal oscillates between narcissistic megalomania and utter abjection and can be affected by a billion parameters taking us from melancholia to outrage. **Thus, even the concrete individual is composed of class fractions, race fractions, gender fractions.** In the form of signs, we clip coupons that validate our investments. The language of object-identification, we observe here, cannot really keep up with the fluctuations resulting from the throughput of code as we work to identify and disidentify our agency. Can we audit a different mode of emergence, a different futurity than one inexorably overcoded by capital? Of course this is still somewhat simplistic and also class-specific, as many (billions even) never get to participate as an enfranchised global citizen in any aspect or moment of life, even if the lived experience of these same billions is radically overdetermined by the class(es) from which they are excluded.4 The gilded poverty of the enfranchised, as opposed to the mere poverty of the rest, is now a measure of connectivity. A more complete view is that we are the product of the world system and thus everything we are has been produced vis-à-vis globalization, and therefore everything bears the trace of the system in its entirety (again, in varying proportions). This conceptualization of concrete individuals (bodies) as global communitarian products forced to varying degrees into templates of individualized risk by capitalist states, is not to erase class; however, it suggests that, just as Fanon saw the great European metropoles as the product of third world labor, we are all products of the worst conditions prevailing in the Global South and around the planet. Global inequality is internal to **our being**. It is us. How then does one (such a one who is relatively enfranchised by the derivative language of texts such as this one) inventory those relations and produce them as formations of solidarity rather than as disavowed residuum? Is there another data-sphere, a communist one? Can we build communist interfaces, networks, **and finance?** How would **we register,** track, amplify, and render actionable the communitarian affinities, **solidarities, obligations, and debts**, the resources in the wake of too many genocides to count, that in actual practice **underpin the official economy,** collective life, and whatever authentic hope is left to our species? Perhaps we have arrived at a question worthy of theory: Is there, could there be communist algorithms? Communist derivatives? Derivative communism? We are looking for that path. To add to my point about the shifting, distributed character of political actors—that goes so far as to suggest that we can no longer think only of actors but rather must think of vectors and fields in addition to thinking of the resources developed in cultures of survival—I will make a second observation. **A political intervention** in the advertisarial relations that have this planet heading toward environmental doomsday requires not only revolutionary policy but revolutionary culture. (I defer further discussion of a third requirement, revolutionary finance, to the final chapter.) This culture must take into account that, for many on this planet, Armageddon is not the future but an **ongoing constant**. My call here (which should not be entirely unfamiliar, as it gives petit bourgeois intellectuals something important to do) is to (re)politicize semiotic and affective structures and practices, including and perhaps especially those we might control, for example our own utterances—our expression. Of course, to call them “our own” seems to contradict what I’ve said about the expropriation of the cognitive- linguistic and the intensification of aphanisis by visual, verbal, and digital media derivatives, but it is here precisely that we confront one of the significant material contradictions of our time: who or what speaks in us? This question, which I shorthand using the phrase the politics of the utterance and which you can experience palpably right now (as you endeavor to think), seems to me to insist that **our idea-making** must actively produce its solidarity with the dispossessed. We must struggle for the **radical constellation.** The question concerning the politics of the utterance, asked here in a strange passage of this text through a beyond-academic terrain, a moonless forest the traversal of which may or may not at this point lead us back to the plot, also raises the question of becoming, as well as the questions of agency and of action within the capitalist image— programmable images, racializing and racist images that, in the terms we have set out, are functionally omnipresent. Continuous media throughput has generated a capitalist imaginary structuring both language function and imaging processes, coordinated at scales and by calculative logics that exceed individual comprehension. Though the occasion is upon us, **we must struggle for space and time to think. We must** open a spread on which to bet against the dominant order. We glimpse, and we feel, that to insist upon the unremitting relevance of both culture-making and of cross-cultural transnational solidarity helps **to avoid platform fetishism** because it sees the internet and its machines not as a set or collection of autonomous technologies but as a historically emergent system of value-expropriative communication and organization, built directly upon older but nonetheless contemporaneous forms of inequality, including but not limited to historically emergent techniques of gendering, racialization, and imperialism, and embedded in the living flesh of the world. All of this calculative interconnectivity and networked agency implies, contradictorily, in fact, that the internet is not all advertising—but neither is advertising all advertising. It is also murder and struggle. Banksy knows that. The advertisarial relation is the programmatic relation encrypted in the apparatuses of capital: the war of each against all, taken all the way from finance, computation, and surveillance to the speech act and the imagination in accord with the autopoietic algorithm of the distributed Leviathan. Marx himself saw capitalism as vampiric, and today’s processes of **capitalization are even more totalitarian**, more widely distributed, and more blood-, life-, and indeed soul-sucking than even in prior eras—though such comparisons **don’t do those killed by past iterations of capitalism any good.** Despite the disavowals to the contrary, we recognize that capital needs labor, needs metabolic time more desperately and more voraciously than ever before (what else is biopolitics?) and, furthermore, that it wages war on life-time on all fronts, in order to secure labor power, its product and basis, at a discount. The pyramids of inequality become internal fractals, and even as the base broadens, the tip with the all-seeing eye (that is not a subject) ascends ever higher. **We do not** yet **know what can be destroyed** or indeed built with the massive appropriation of Banksy’s rocks, but we do know that at present **there is** total war against our using them to build anticapitalist, nonhierarchical, horizontal, solidary sociality. The refusal or détournement **of capital’s encroachment** **is** itself a creative act. Perhaps we have only **begun to glimpse what** a total **refusal might achieve.**

## Case

### 1NC---Presumption

#### Vote on Presumption

#### 1)    Conflation – they conflate scholarship with praxis --- setting the burden for aff solvency at simple introduction of “new” knowledge just devolves into infinitely regressive debates about how new is new enough and means lectures, seminars, articles, and books all solve. Failure to forward a material strategy of care work means:

a.    There’s no mechanism to resolve their impacts

b.    There’s only a risk the aff is net worse than seminar discussions because they’ve introduced it in a competitive activity which necessitates negation, not dialogue

#### 2)    Unending story – it’s impossible to determine when we’ve sufficiently done care work and can now translate it outside debate which means we never actually resolve their impacts --– encourages affs to forward un-nuanced descriptions of the squo which

a.    Disincentivizes research over specific theories of power and violence and turns their model of debate

b.    Pacifies radical activism and context-specific education and ignoring material instances of violence in favor of broad over-arching theorizations

#### The aff has no connection to why its reading in debate is good – if they are right about their argument about how “pitting people against eachother” or forms of competitiveness reify individualizism, then the reading of the aff in a intrinsically competitive space is a double turn

### 1NC---Inclusion DA

#### Making the ballot a referendum on the inclusion of identity in debate is violent — it requires oppressed groups to identify as defective and powerless while maintaining the Western belief that power is scarce commodity that must be fought for in the market of suffering.

Tuck & Yang 14   
(Eve Associate Professor of Educational Foundations and Coordinator of Native American Studies @ the State University of New York at New Paltz, and K. Wayne Assistant Professor in the Ethnic Studies Department @ UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research”, <https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf>)

Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that educational research and much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality, and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken. Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. (p. 343). Hooks’ words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343).

#### The 1AC’s embracement of “care” produces a new form of immaterial labor which becomes the basis for harnessing the body as a therapeutic human tool of recovery

Voronka 2017. . Jijan Voronka is SJE PhD Graduate @ University of Toronto Ontario Institute For Studies In Education. Studies in Social Justice. “Turning Mad Knowledge into Affective Labor: The Case of the Peer Support Worker”. Volume 69, Number 2, June 2017 pp. 333-338.] VR

Turning Mad Knowledge into Affective Labor:

Efforts to include service users as peer workers in mental health research, evaluation, and service provision is ever increasing.7 As care models move toward the more “progressive” (and cost-efficient) practices of harm reduction, recovery, and resilience models, peer workers as “experts by experience” are understood to be uniquely positioned to provide such services and support.8 In this way, madness as an experience and mad as a marginal identity has suddenly become harnessed as a commodity for exchange in neoliberal care and service markets. By far the most recognized, formalized, and professionalized type of this peer labor is peer support work. Peer support workers are hired to use their own experiences of distress, difference, and/or contact with the mental health system to work relationally with and on service users in a variety of settings. Peer support rests on the premise that we use our experiences to connect and relate with service users in ways that other professionals cannot. The roots of current recovery models emerged in the 1980s with the recovery movement, which together with consumer/survivor/ex-patient and mad activism demanded a radical reconfiguration of biomedical approaches to madness confined under the domain of the psy disciplines. With the recovery movement, informal peer support as mutual aid emerged as a way to offer advocacy and support outside the remit of medical authority. However, the meaning and practice of recovery and peer support are significantly recalibrated when they move from “movements” into “models,” and such models (informed by clinical logics and outcomes) are absorbed into dominant mental health practices.9 In Western countries, peer support workers are increasingly employed in dominant mental health care sites: in community mental health teams, drop-in services, veteran and workplace mental health supports, hospital psychiatric units, and forensic units. Formal models for recovery and peer support work have developed and slowly have been streamlined by dominate mental health systems as a newer and less costly way to encourage service users to self-govern. While the kind of labor that peer support workers perform varies depending on organizational context, when employed in dominant mental health systems, peers work within clinical recovery models meant to complement pathological approaches to madness. Peer support work is thus an emerging form of precarious labor that invites people with usually denigrated experiences to work within the preexisting tight boundaries of psy professional workplaces. Throughdour performance as peers, we realize the goal of neoliberal biopolitical projects by embodying the tenets of normative citizenship: by managing ourselves and others, and most important, by getting back to work. But peer work not only reintegrates otherwise excluded identities back into the circuits of productive citizenship; it also constitutes a still-unexplored form of affective labor. Affective labor “is the labour of human contact and interaction, which involves the production and manipulation of affects. Its ‘products’ are relationships and emotional responses: ‘a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement or passion.’”10 Affective labor is thus immaterial in the sense that its products are intangible, even though it is usually corporeal and mixes with material forms of labor.”11 While conceptualizations of affective labor continue to be contentious, reworked, and critiqued, Johanna Oksala notes that this is partly because forms of affective labor are so varied, and we need recognize the different forms of affective labor in context, as well as the novel power relations and political consequences across disparate sites.12 Through our status as peers, mental health models of recovery, resilience, and responsibility are graphed onto our bodies, and as we move through encounters with clients, produce feeling and emotion. A key question here is: to what effect are we deploying our work to orient clients toward feelings and responses that actually encourage compliance and cooperation with dominant conceptual models of mental illness? In my own four-year ethnographic research on peer work, peer support workers discussed work role expectations such as sharing their own recovery journeys (which often follow from-tragedy-to-triumph scripts), disclosing complex experiences of psychiatric medications and drug use, and advising how to effectively negotiate through distress with service users.13 Through peer support work roles, experiential knowledge is being mobilized in particular ways: to modify the emotional experiences of clients. When working within dominant mental health service provision, our inclu- 336 | American Quarterly sion does not transcend the social, legal, political, and economic regimes that organize, manage, administer, and intervene on madness. Our inclusion does little to disrupt structural violence, and rather allows psy powers to proceed. With formalized training in both recovery and peer support work, peers are expected to come to their positions versed in how to draw on resiliency and recovery models of care to promote feelings of empathy, hope, optimism, and empowerment in those they work with.14 Thus the value that mad labor brings to inclusionary practices is used to manage and modify madness. What is lost in current configurations of peer support work is the paid labor that redresses the larger systemic policy, program, and discursive frames that together solidify madness as the site that needs to be fixed In “What Do Peer Support Workers Do? A Job Description,” Nora Jacobson, Lucy Trojanowski, and Carolyn Dewa seek to define the labor that peer support workers do as part of a multidisciplinary team working within a psychiatric tertiary-care facility. They describe the main types of labor that peers do when working directly with clients as advocacy, connecting to resources, experiential sharing, building community, relationship building, group facilitation, skill building/mentoring/goal setting, and socialization/self-esteem building.15 Peer support work is here defined as largely relational: they cite “experiential sharing” as how peers spend most of their work hours, which includes “sharing common experiences; listening to client’s [sic] experiences and sharing one’s own experiences.”16 This individually focused labor is oriented toward modifying the feelings and emotive responses of clients. Further, peer support workers act as symbolic figures: “They provide ‘someone to look up to’ for clients who are seeking ways of living that will help them to meet their goals. For staff, they stand out as exemplars of ‘recovery in action.’”17 Thus it is not only the relations created through “experiential sharing” that evokes and modifies feelings but also our embodied presence as peers within mental health settings that create affective potential for clients, other mental health workers, and peer workers themselves. Yet critical disability and mad studies scholars and activists have argued that focusing on madness as the problem that needs to be fixed distracts from the tyrannies of normalcy and the disablisms that produce our ways of being as illness.18 Orienting peer labor toward producing feelings of hope, optimism, and empowerment in individuals risks ignoring the sociopolitical orders that subject us. Indeed, even advocacy work, long understood as a cornerstone to systemic counterdiscursive cultural production and education work, gets rescripted through peer support work into an individualized form of productive labor.19 While incorporating “people with lived experience” into mental health systems as a way to improve services has been both advocated for and argued against in the long history of consumer/survivor/ex-patient and mad social movement activism, the figure of the peer support worker can show us the limitations of such inclusionary measures. In effect, our labor is directed toward the affective governance of those configured as “like us,” while challenging the larger regimes of power that define and manage “mental illness” remains beyond our job description. As mad activists continue to unsettle recovery and the role that peer support workers play within such systems, we need to seriously consider the question “will the peer ‘movement’ have any functions beyond psychiatry?”20 As mad scholars and activists, we need to continue to reassess how we mobilize and enact our marginalized identities when commodifying our experiences within the systems that sustain our subjugation.